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ABSTRACT: Ambiguously poised between composition and 
improvisation, works designated as fantasia in the sixteenth 
century thrived on the imaginative power of virtuoso perfor-
mers. Or so the term would seem to suggest: it is not imme-
diately clear in what sense this music should be understood 
and singled out as the product of the imagination. Isn’t music, 
any kind of music, the product of the imagination? What idea 
of imagination was this particular kind of music meant to re-
present? Drawing on the Aristotelian doctrine of the internal 
senses, this essay explores the relationship between fantasia as 
a musical process and sixteenth-century notions of fantasia as 
a mental process. From our vantage point in history, fanta-
sia offers a rare opportunity to observe a cultural and musical 
practice aimed at translating the workings of the mind into 
a sensible object, which the perceiving subject can then (re)
experience as a representation of his own inner life, in the way 
he himself imagines it.
KEYWORDS: : Fantasia; Imagination; Improvisation; Mind; 
Sense perception; Zarlino; Aristotle; Della Barba; Varchi.
RESUMO: Ambiguamente posicionada entre a composição 
e a improvisação, as obras designadas como fantasia floresce-
ram no poder imaginativo dos intérpretes virtuosos durante 
o Século XVI. Ou assim o termo pareceria sugerir: não nos 
fica claro de imediato em que sentido essa música deveria ser 
entendida e distinguida como o produto da imaginação. Não 
seria a música, qualquer tipo de música, o produto da imagi-
nação? Que ideia de imaginação deveria representar esse tipo 
específico de música? Com base na doutrina aristotélica dos 
sentidos internos, este ensaio explora a relação entre fantasia 
como um processo musical e a noção quinhentista de fantasia 
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como um processo mental. A partir do nosso ponto de vista 
histórico, a noção de fantasia oferece uma rara oportunidade 
de observar uma prática cultural e musical que visa traduzir 
o funcionamento da mente em um objeto sensível, a qual o 
sujeito percipiente pode, então, (re)experimentar como uma 
representação de sua própria vida interior, na forma como ele 
a imagina.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Fantasia; Imaginação; Improvisação; 
Mente; Percepções dos Sentidos; Zarlino; Aristóteles; Della 
Barba; Varchi.
It was at the end of a journey of over a thousand years that 
the faculty of the mind known as phantasia found its way into 
the world of sensory objects and became music. It seems that 
the term began to be used in a musical context in the late fif-
teenth century. A three-part instrumental piece bearing the title 
“Ile fantazies de Joskin” appears in the Casanatense Chanson-
nier, a handsomely decorated  manuscript that was perhaps 
commissioned as a gift for Isabella d’Este on the occasion of her 
betrothal to Gian Francesco Gonzaga in 1480 (BENTHEM; 
BROWN, 1987, p. 108-111)2. With the development of print-
ing techniques that made different kinds of music available in 
ever-greater quantities, fantasia emerged in the sixteenth cen-
tury as a staple of popular collections for lute, vihuela, key-
board instruments, and instrumental ensembles3.  Ambigu-
ously poised between composition and improvisation, fantasia 
thrived on the imaginative power of virtuoso performers. Or so 
the term would seem to suggest: it is not immediately clear in 
what sense this music should be understood and singled out as 
the product of the imagination. Isn’t music, any kind of mu-
sic, the product of the imagination? What idea of imagination 
was this particular kind of music meant to represent? Perhaps 
it is only fitting that music purporting to display the musician’s 
fantasy would appear to lack easily circumscribable bounda-
ries. However, from a stylistic point of view, the boundaries are 
there, and they become relatively predictable as we grow more 
familiar with the conventions of the genre4.   Here fantasia does 
not stand for the unbridled flight of the mind into invisible 
worlds, or the ability to transcend the reality of natural objects. 
In other words, of the twelve conceptions of imagination sur-
2. See also Lockwood (2009). 
The most comprehensive 
survey of the use of the term 
“fantasia” in music is BETZ 
(2001).
3. To avoid confusion, I will 
use the term phantasia to refer 
to the faculty of the mind, and 
fantasia to refer to the musical 
genre.
4.  In this sense, following 
John Griffiths’ suggestion, it 
is useful to think of fantasia as 
set of procedures rather than 
a form (GRIFFITHS, 1990, 
p. 1-6).
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veyed by Leslie Stevenson, we can lay aside those that concern 
the ability to think of things acknowledged to be fictitious, as 
well as “the liability to think of something that the subject be-
lieves to be real, but which is not.” (STEVENSON, 2003, p. 
238-259). To some extent, the sixteenth-century musical con-
ception of fantasia seems to resonate more closely with the Aris-
totelian tradition, in particular with the notion of compositive 
imagination, namely the faculty of the mind that composes, 
divides, and reassembles sensible forms. I shall return to this 
later, but before proceeding to the principal questions, it may 
be worth dwelling on some specific features of the music, and 
in particular on the somewhat counterintuitive coexistence of 
structural freedom and contrapuntal constraint.
Fantasias tend to exhibit techniques of imitative counter-
point5. One of the most important manuals of improvisation 
of the sixteenth century, El Arte de Tañer Fantasia by the Span-
ish organist Tomás de Sancta Maria, is largely devoted to in-
structing how to improvise in imitative style, which, together 
with the chordal technique of improvisation (tañer a conso-
nancias), provides the textural and structural qualities of “the 
art of playing the fantasia.”6 Interlocking points of imitation 
in a style rooted in improvisatory practices were already a key 
component of the Fantazies de Joskin, and by the end of the 
sixteenth century, fantasias, especially of the monothematic 
kind, could very well serve as showpieces of contrapuntal in-
genuity7.  Works with similar, sometimes indistinguishable, 
features were also called ricercare. In fact, the terms fantasia 
and ricercare were often used interchangeably. Ricercare – to 
search for, to seek, or to research, to investigate – evokes an 
inquisitive disposition, a spirit of exploration, as well as a will-
ingness to undertake a journey whose purpose may simply be 
the journey itself8.  In his book on architecture (1461-64), Filar-
ete evokes a similar linguistic and conceptual cluster by turning 
“fantasia” into the object of the artist’s creative action: “investigare 
e cercare nuove fantasie e nuove cose.” 9  It is true that imitative 
polyphony is a pervasive feature of Renaissance music. It was 
the native language of professionals working at the high end 
of the musical market of the time. In these terms, its applica-
tion under the rubric of fantasia is not by itself surprising. The 
question is rather what distinguishes fantasia from other types 
of imitative counterpoint.
5. Early examples of fanta-
sia rely much less on imita-
tive techniques and contain 
long episodes in free coun-
terpoint and in chordal 
writing. Imitation becomes 
a more pervasive feature 
starting in the 1540s. 
6.   Tomás de Santa María, 
Libro llamado Arte de tañer 
fantasía (Valladolid, 1565; 
facsimile edition Barce-
lona: Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, 
Institución “Milà i Fon-
tanals,” Departamento de 
Musicología, 2007. See 
also Roig-Francolí (1995, 
p. 461-471).writing. 
Imitation becomes a more 
pervasive feature starting in 
the 1540s.  
7. Gregory Butler (1974, p. 
602-15) links the “sequen-
tial imitations” found in 
early examples of fantasia 
to techniques of improvised 
vocal counterpoint. On 
improvised vocal counter-
point in general see Ferand 
(1956, p. 129-174), and, 
more recently, Canguilhem 
(2011, p. 55-103).
8. A particularly interesting 
example, in terms of both 
form and nomenclature, 
is Giuliano Tiburtino’s 
Fantasie et recerchari a tre 
voci (1549), on which see 
Haar (1973, p. 223-238). 
For a modern edition of the 
music see Giuliano Tibur-
tino, Baldesar Donato, 
Cipriano de Rore, Adriano 
Willaert, and Nadal, Fan-
tesie, et recerchari a tre voci, 
accomodate da cantare et 
sonare per ogni instrumento 
(Venice, 1549), ed. Robert 
Judd (New York: Garland, 
1994).
9. Kemp (1977, p. 370-
371) points out the 
similarity between Filarete’s 
language and later musical 
terminology. See also Fil-
arete (1965, p. 114).
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Gioseffo Zarlino makes an oblique allusion to a similar 
question in Chapter 26 of the third book of his Istitutioni har-
moniche (1558). The topic under discussion is the choice of 
the “soggetto” of a composition, that is, the material that the 
composer will subject to elaboration, or more specifically the 
initial musical idea from which the other parts in a polyphonic 
piece are derived. A subject can be borrowed from a pre-existing 
work, or can be newly invented. In the latter case, one way of 
proceeding is for the composer to derive
[…] his subject as he composes the parts of a composition, that 
is when he derives one voice from another and arrives at the sub-
ject as he composes the parts all together, then that fragment of 
it from which he derives the parts of the rest of the composition 
is called the subject. Musicians call this “composing by fancy” 
(comporre di fantasia). It could be as well be called counter-
pointing, or making counterpoint, as one chooses (ZARLINO, 
1968, p. 53)10.  
What Zarlino seems to be describing is a procedure in which 
the composer starts with a contrapuntal idea or “invention,” 
which is in turn used to generate the subject of the next sec-
tion of the work. Implicit in this description is the suggestion 
that some form of preliminary planning is latent within the 
initial idea. The connection between fantasia and the use of an 
original subject devised by the composer is clarified in Chapter 
43 on “the method of writing counterpoints upon a part or 
diminished subject.” Of the two examples provided by Zarlino, 
the first is based on a pre-existing subject (abstracted from Wil-
laert’s Scimus hoc nostrum meruisse crimen), while the second, 
on an original subject, is said to be “tutto composto di fantasia” 
[entirely made out of fantasy] (ZARLINO, 1968, p. 102-103). 
But what is relevant for us here is that Zarlino seems a little puz-
zled by the fact that this way of writing music is called comporre 
di fantasia – an expression in use among practicing musicians, 
as he is ready to point out – although it does not seem to differ 
significantly from what is simply called counterpoint. 
Although fantasia was often associated with improvisation, 
Zarlino is clearly speaking of the way musicians “compose” by 
fantasy. In the 1573 edition of the Istitutioni harmoniche he 
added an expanded section on improvised counterpoint, which 
includes examples of “consequences that are made by fantasy” 
10. On the concept of 
subject” in Zarlino’s theory 
see also Rivera (1993, p. 
73-102).
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(consequenze che si fanno di fantasia). No explicit definition is 
provided, but the examples are all three-voice canons notated as 
a single part, which is consistent with his general definition of 
“consequence.”11 Later on in the same chapter Zarlino (1966, 
p. 314) refers to them, a bit unexpectedly, as improvised pieces 
without subject (“a mente senza soggetto”)12. The notion that 
there can be music without subject would seem to contradict 
his previous definition of what constitutes the subject of a 
musical work: “What I call the subject […] is either the first 
part to be written or the first to be imagined by the composer” 
(ZARLINO, 1968, p. 103). However, it can be argued that the 
premise implicit in Zarlino’s notion of fantasia is an idea of self-
generating counterpoint; a procedure in which the musician 
“arrives at the subject as he composes the parts all together,” in 
the sense that no evident temporal distinction can be drawn 
between the invention of the initial contrapuntal conceit and 
its manipulation, between the excogitation of the idea and the 
realization of the form13.  This classificatory method becomes 
clearer if we consider that the pedagogical norm against which 
every variation was measured took as its starting point the adop-
tion and study of a pre-existing or previously-created subject. 
Along similar lines, James Haar summarizes the early history 
of the ricercare in the following terms: “A ricercare was from 
the start a composer’s elaboration of some idea; by 1550 this 
elaboration usually took the form of imitative counterpoint, 
and if this counterpoint was self-generated the ricerca was done 
di fantasia.” (HAAR, 1973, p. 236-237).
It is difficult to stay perched firmly on any musical defini-
tion of fantasia. However, if we combine Zarlino’s use of the 
term within his classification system with the practical applica-
tions of the same term in the musical collections of the time 
— admittedly broader and fuzzier on the differences — we can 
highlight some elements that will become of particular inter-
est in the rest of this essay. The degree of structural freedom 
that fantasia enjoys is associated with the non-textual and 
non-subject dependent nature of its musical material. The two 
properties are to some extent related, in the sense that, against 
the backdrop of Renaissance musical culture, writing music in-
dependent of a vocal model can be equated to writing music 
independent of a pre-existing soggetto. This is true even in cases 
where the structural properties of the music are described as 
11. On the terminology 
adopted by Zarlino to 
classify intervallically 
exact or inexact types of 
imitation see Haar (1971, 
p. 226-54).
12. On this passage see 
also Lorenzetti (2009, p. 
137-138).
13. “É ben vero, che 
volendo comporre il 
soggetto da se stesso, 
potrà aiutato da una parte 
della sua compositione 
comporre l’altra, di modo 
che tutto in un tempo verrà 
a comporre il soggetto, et 
a dar fine alla cantilena” 
[If he chooses to write his 
own subject, he may find 
that one part helps him 
compose the other so that 
he can at the same time 
compose the subject and 
complete the composition] 
(ZARLINO, 1968, p. 103, 
slightly modified English 
translation).
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the product of a contrapuntal mechanism generating its own 
subject, as in canonic writing. In brief, as a general proposi-
tion, the subject or subjects of a fantasia are feely formed in the 
musician’s mind. In fantasias based on subjects borrowed from 
vocal models, the subject is usually treated as a solmization sub-
ject, that is, as a textless pitch collection to be explored contra-
puntally. As music devoid of language, fantasia is not bound 
to the structural and expressive demands of language. Nor is 
it bound to the regular patterns of dance music. It can indeed 
unfold of its own accord, free to follow the musician’s imagina-
tion14. However, this does not mean that fantasia necessarily 
unfolds in a rhapsodic, uncontrolled fashion. On the contrary, 
the principle of elaboration remains responsible for many of its 
distinctive traits. If anything, it is through the fantasia that the 
principle of elaboration can draw attention to itself (in the true 
sense of ricercare), allowing its author to pursue the pleasure of a 
purely musical inquisitiveness without the restrictions imposed 
by other formal or textual considerations15. From this point 
of view, Zarlino is right in remarking that comporre di fanta-
sia and writing counterpoint are not two easily distinguishable 
concepts. The technique is basically the same. But the flow of 
thoughts in the musical mind, so to speak, is not. In a fantasia, 
the imitative fabric of the polyphony does not need to be sus-
tained in a motet-like style or to exhibit an unswerving sense of 
direction. It can be edgy or serene, can be hijacked by idiomatic 
passages for the keyboard or the lute, or can be commandeered 
for denser textural games. 
This last point leads us back to the relationship between 
fantasia and improvisation, a relationship that can be delicate 
because we can only rely on music preserved in manuscripts 
or prints. First of all, improvisation justifies stylistic license, 
which may in turn be presented as the free manifestation of 
the imagination. Moreover, we cannot assume that the score 
represents a record of an extemporaneous performance. The 
same markers of an improvisatory style can be harnessed in 
pre-compositional strategies in order to reproduce the effect of 
improvised music. The result is a realistic replica of spontaneity 
fixed in musical notation. It is clear that Renaissance society 
recognized and valued the specific qualities of this type of mu-
sic, whether they were perceived as real or simulated, and the 
best-selling authors in the genre were themselves celebrated in-
14. A special case is the 
so-called parody-fantasia, 
a freely ornamented in-
strumental arrangement or 
elaboration of a polyphonic 
vocal model (a motet or 
a madrigal, for example). 
See Ward (1965, p. 208-
228), and Mengozzi (1990, 
p. 7-17). As far as the 
use of dance formulas is 
concerned, exceptions are 
Galilei’s six fantasias based 
on the romanesca pattern 
in the 1568 edition of Il 
Fronimo. On Galilei’s two 
examples of parody-fanta-
sia see Canguilhem (2001, 
p. 107-121).
15. This point is already 
resonant in Thomas Mor-
ley’s definition of “fantasy”: 
“The most principal and 
chiefest kind of music 
which is made without a 
ditty is the Fantasy, that is 
when a musician taketh a 
point at his pleasure and 
wresteth and turneth it as 
he list, making either much 
or little of it according as 
shall seem best in his own 
conceit. In this may more 
art be shown than in any 
other music because the 
composer is tied to noth-
ing, but that he may add, 
diminish, and alter at his 
pleasure.” (MORLEY, 
1973, p. 296).
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strumentalists and improvisers. There is also evidence of a more 
general use of fantasia as synonymous with improvisation. The 
best know document in this regard is the exam for the post of 
organist at San Marco in Venice. One of its tests required the 
candidates to sonare di fantasia on a subject chosen at random 
from a choirbook. Interestingly enough, the examiners further 
required that the improvised piece maintain an audible four-
part contrapuntal structure, “as if four singers were singing.”16  
In an entirely different context, Vincenzo Galilei confirms the 
correlation between fantasia and improvisation in his discus-
sion of the ancient art of improvised sung poetry. The subject 
of the dispute is “how the ancients composed their songs.” In 
particular, Piero Strozzi, one of the interlocutors in Galilei’s 
dialogue, wonders how singer-musicians would compose and 
memorize long poems. Giovanni Bardi argues that, since at 
that time there was no distinction between poet and singer, 
writing poetry and adapting it to a suitable musical recitation 
were not two entirely separate tasks. “Therefore, after studying 
carefully the poem, history, fable, or whatever it may be, what 
tonos and harmonia [modo] and which air suited it, they then 
sang it, as they say, ‘to the kithara,’ impromptu and out of their 
heads [di fantasia]” (GALILEI, 2003, p. 245).
The principle of elaboration, and its temporal dimension 
as a process observable in real time through the lens of an ex-
temporaneous creation (whether real or fictional), will play 
an increasingly significant role as we broaden our analysis to 
the multifaceted meaning of fantasia in the philosophical and 
artistic culture of sixteenth-century Italy. It will also become 
increasingly important to reflect on the interplay between rule 
and freedom, norm and license — seemingly contradictory 
principles whose concurrence is precisely what endows fantasia 
with its distinctive character. In 1650, in an attempt to make 
order out of an ebullient multiplying of musical styles, Atha-
nasius Kircher captures the terms of this double identity un-
der the category of stylus phantasticus. Freedom is what shapes 
music that is not bound to words or to a musical subject. But 
it is significant that Kircher does not find it odd that the same 
music, free and unrestricted, can also serve as a tool for the ap-
prehension and display of the hidden logic of music:
16. “Si apre il libro di 
capella et a sorte si trova 
un principio di Kirie o 
vero di motetto, et si copia 
mandandolo a l’organista 
che concorre, il quale sopra 
quel sugetto ne l’istesso 
organo vacante deve sonar 
di fantasia regolatamente, 
non confondendo le parti 
come che quattro cantori 
cantassero.” See Morelli 
(1998, p. 265). Morelli 
provides further evidence 
of the contrapuntal orienta-
tion behind the organistic 
practice of “playing by 
fantasy” (MORELLI, 1998, 
p. 261-263).
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The “fantastic style,” suitable for instruments, is the most free 
and unrestricted method of composing. It is bound to nothing, 
neither to words nor to a musical subject. It was established to 
showcase ingenuity (ingenium) as well as to teach the hidden 
logic of music and the clever combination of musical phrases 
and fugues. It is divided into works that are commonly called 
fantasias, ricercatas, toccatas, and sonatas (KIRCHER, 1970, 
p. 585)17. 
 
At this point, we need to deepen our understanding of the 
sense in which the concept of fantasia fulfilled the musical expe-
rience I sketched above by probing contemporaneous theories 
of perception and cognition for answers. However, while it is 
undeniable that a great deal can be inferred by such an approach 
— as I will seek to demonstrate — the opposite is also true. The 
study of the musical representation of the power of the imagi-
nation can help us to clarify how people understood phantasia 
in the sixteenth century, especially outside the specialized fields 
of knowledge cultivated by professional philosophers. That a 
musical genre labeled fantasia should emerge in this period is by 
itself an interesting event, because in those years the philosophi-
cal debate inspired by humanism and Neoplatonism sparked a 
renewed interest in the nature, potential, and limits of human 
imagination. This trend was in part due to an increasing skepti-
cism toward the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of 
the mind, to which I shall return. Emblematic is the publica-
tion in 1501 of Giovanni Francesco Pico della Mirandola’s De 
imaginatione, in which a detailed reexamination of the Aristote-
lian tradition serves as a starting point not only to reaffirm the 
importance of this mental faculty in the human mechanisms of 
knowledge, but also to warn against its dangerous side effects18. 
Obviously, to expect that phantasia would have one univocal 
meaning is useless. We cannot begin by deciding what phanta-
sia and imagination meant in the Renaissance. It is indeed hard 
to isolate exact correspondences in meaning cutting through 
natural philosophy, ethics, rhetoric, or poetics, especially as we 
approach more colloquial and general usages of language.  It is 
more profitable to think about this issue in terms of a cluster 
of core ideas taking up residence in different semantic fields, 
where, at the end of a journey that can last centuries, it adjusts 
to changing needs and circumstances. Therefore, my primary 
goal here is to determine what modulations in meaning occur 
17. This passage and the 
examples provided by 
Kircher are discussed in 
Collins (2005, p. 29-52); 
and Brewer (2011, p. 
25-28).
18. See in particular Maria 
Muccillo’s assessment of 
Pico della Mirandola’s 
philosophical agenda in 
(MUCCILLO, 2007, p. 
11-35).
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as multiple (yet related) concepts of phantasia are applied in 
various cultural practices and areas of knowledge.
Shifting mental gears
Since I have been using phantasia and imagination in-
terchangeably, it bears mentioning that imaginatio was the 
accepted Latin translation of the Greek phantasia. There are 
exceptions, most notably Marsilio Ficino, who, despite his no-
toriously ambiguous use of the two terms, sometimes distin-
guishes between the faculty responsible for the combination of 
sensory data into mental images, which he calls imagination, 
and a higher faculty capable of a preliminary or pre-intellective 
form of judgment, for which he uses the term “phantasia.”19 
The equivalence of phantasia and imaginatio had an authorita-
tive source in Thomas Aquinas, and no significant distinction 
is detectable in the sixteenth-century texts I have consulted20. 
The Renaissance received the “Aristotelian” theory of the in-
ternal senses from Islamic philosophic sources (especially Avi-
cenna and Averroes) through the lenses of the interpretation 
and systematization elaborated by the Scholastic philosophers21. 
The subdivision of the cognitive operations of the sensitive soul 
into separate mental faculties is understandable as a response to 
the difficulties inherent in Aristotle’s De Anima 3.3, the foun-
dational text of this enormous effort of scholarly imagination. 
In Aristotle, phantasia occupies an intermediate position be-
tween perceiving and thinking, bridging the gap between the 
two, for the intellect cannot operate directly on the sensory 
data impressed upon the sense organs. Aristotle’s main concern 
is indeed to demonstrate that phantasia is different from both 
sense perception and intellection. In the two passages in which 
a direct definition is provided, Aristotle states that “imagina-
tion is that in virtue of which we say that an image occurs to 
us,” and that “the imagination [is] a movement coming about 
from the activity of sense perception.” (ARISTOTLE, 1986, 
p. 198-200). The correct interpretation of Aristotle’s thought 
has been the subject of rich debate among modern scholars22. 
With an eye toward the medieval and Renaissance approach to 
the question of what phantasia is and how it operates at the in-
tersection of sensation and intellection, I would stress the view 
that Aristotle’s aim is to explain how the external world appears 
19. See Muccillo (2007, p. 
13 and note 24); GARIN 
(1988, p. 3-20); and KATI-
NIS (2002, p. 217-223).
20.  “Sic ergo ad receptio-
nem formarum sensibilium 
ordinatur sensus proprius 
et communis, de quorum 
distinctione post dicetur. 
Ad harum autem formarum 
retentionem aut conserva-
tionem ordinatur phantasia, 
sive imaginatio, quae idem 
sunt, est enim phantasia sive 
imaginatio quasi thesaurus 
quidam formarum per 
sensum acceptarum” (So 
the proper senses and the 
common sense are directed 
at receiving sensible forms; 
the difference between the 
two will be discussed below. 
Phantasia or imagination—
the two are the same—is 
directed at the retention 
or preservation of these 
forms. For phantasia, or 
imagination, serves as a kind 
of treasury for forms gras-
ped through the [external] 
senses). Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae, 
78.4. English translation: 
(AQUINAS, 2002, p. 75). 
On the Latin translations 
of Aristotle’s terminology 
in medieval philosophy see 
Spinosa (1988, p. 119-133).
21. The most comprehensi-
ve study of the theory of the 
internal senses is still Wolf-
son (1935, p. 69-133). For 
a briefer survey see Harvey 
(1975). A particularly useful 
discussion of the issues 
surrounding the notion of 
phantasia in a pre-Cartesian 
world may be found in 
Sepper (1996, p. 13-28).
22. I will only cite here the 
studies of Nussbaum (1978, 
p. 221-269); Schofield 
(1978, p. 99-130), also avai-
lable in Essays on Aristotle’s 
De Anima, ed. Martha 
C. Nussbaum and Amélie 
Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992); 
and Wedin (1988). For a 
reappraisal of the debate see 
Camassa (1988, p. 23-55), 
and more recently Sheppard 
(2014).
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to us in the mind. This form of apprehension is a step forward 
from the purely passive reception of sensory stimuli impressed 
upon the sense organs. It requires an active contribution of the 
mind; however, appearing, in this sense, is not understand-
ing, although understanding and discursive thinking need the 
mental imagery produced by phantasia. In other words, sense 
perception sets phantasia into motion, and phantasia feeds the 
intellect. What it is exactly that phantasia feeds the intellect is 
one of the principal points of contention. These would be the 
“mental images” (phantasmata) that according to Aristotle are 
always present in the mind as a precondition for thinking, even 
when perception itself is absent (I do not need to see a tree to 
recall the image of a tree). But in what sense phantasmata may 
or may not be understood as mental images is far from clear. 
To use terminology current in the Middle Ages and the Renais-
sance, sensory stimuli reach the five external senses as sensible 
forms (or sensible species), and the sensible species are transmit-
ted to the common sense (the receptor of all sensory stimuli). 
Something happens in the “space” between common sense 
and intellection. Sensible species are turned into phantasmata, 
sense-based images reduced to a form accessible to the intellect, 
and as such they become potentially intelligible forms (intelli-
gibilia). In the end, the agent intellect illuminates the phantas-
mata by abstracting intelligible species from sense-based mental 
representations, thus revealing the essence of material objects. 
The problem is to fill that “space” that in Aristotle is occupied 
by the somewhat elusive notion of phantasia.
The definition of a mental map of internal senses (five for 
Avicenna and four for Averroes) had the advantage of provid-
ing an analytical framework for a comprehensive assessment of 
the different tasks that the Aristotelian phantasia seems to per-
form. However, this resulted in a proliferation of separate facul-
ties endowed with individual and restricted functions, among 
which was also the Latin imaginatio. To paint a picture in broad 
strokes, Aristotle’s concept of phantasia came to be equated 
with the sum of the functions of the newly created internal 
senses, which included the redefined faculty of imagination. In 
Thomas Aquinas’s version, mostly based on Averroes, phantasia 
operates at the level of sensible species (Fig. 1).
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        Figure 1
Its primary function is to store the sensory forms collected 
by the common sense, and in this capacity it acts as a type 
of memory, allowing us to recall images of absent objects (in 
absentia sensibilium).  However, forms do not just reside in 
phantasia in an inert state. Phantasia has also the ability to 
divide and recompose sensible species, “forming different 
images of things, even ones that have not been taken in by 
the senses.”23  These new images may not be veridical, but as 
Robert Pasnau has clarified, phantasia, on Aquinas’s account, 
is not the sole faculty responsible for deceptive mental experi-
ences. Illusions occur when phantasia erroneously sends back 
nonveridical images to the common sense, which, caught in a 
sort of short circuit, is unable to distinguish between true sen-
sory impressions and counterfeit sensory impressions caused 
by phantasia (PASNAU, 2002, p. 282-284). In Avicenna the 
passive and active functions of phantasia are assigned to two 
separate internal sense powers, the formative or retentive im-
agination and the compositive imagination. Albertus Mag-
nus, whose interpretation of the Avicennian model exerted 
an enormous influence on the West, prefers to use the term 
“phantasia” to denote compositive imagination, thus reinforc-
ing the link between phantasia and a basic, pre-intellective 
form of elaboration24.  This taxonomy of the internal senses 
was admittedly confusing, especially to those who were not 
professional philosophers but who relied upon natural phi-
losophy to explain aspects of the human experience related 
to poetry, artistic creation, or fundamental passions such as 
love. But the general association between phantasia and an 
elemental process of elaboration by division and composition 
is nonetheless important to understand that nuance of mean-
ing that may have been conveyed by the musical use of the 
term “fantasia” as contrapuntal device. We should notice that 
23.  “One could say that 
although the first impres-
sion on the power of imagi-
nation is brought about 
through the movement 
of sensible things (since 
phantasia is a movement 
made by sense, as is said in 
the De anima [429a 1-2]), 
still there is a certain opera-
tion of the soul in a human 
being that forms various 
images of things by divid-
ing and composing, even 
ones that are not drawn 
from the senses.” Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae 84.6 
ad 2; p. 152 in Pasnau’s 
translation.
24. There are however 
important differences be-
tween Albertus Magnus 
and Avicenna, on which see 
Black (2000, p. 59-75, esp. 
63-66). On Albertus Mag-
nus see also Steneck (1974, 
p. 193-211).
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in Aquinas phantasia is not by itself an apprehensive power, 
although its compositive operations may be misunderstood 
as a pre-intellective analogue of reason. And there is also the 
question of how memory differs from retentive imagination.
As Deborah Black (2000, p. 59) points out, “although the 
medieval doctrine of the internal senses is often treated as mere-
ly physiological and descriptive, Avicenna himself deduces the 
number of internal sense powers by appealing to three epis-
temological principles of faculty differentiation.” The first of 
these principles introduces the concept of “intention” to mark 
the difference between proper and common sensibles available 
through sense perception, and qualities of those same sensibles 
that cannot be apprehended through the senses. The classical 
example is that of the sheep that flees when it sees a wolf. There 
is nothing in the proper and common sensibles of a wolf (its 
color, shape, etc.) that suggests danger, and the sheep cannot 
appeal to a mental category of “wolf” or “enemy” to reach the 
conclusion that what it is seeing is a wolf, and therefore an hos-
tile animal. Yet, the sheep seems to be able to perceive the wolf ’s 
hostility. The question then simply becomes: how can the sheep 
become aware of certain qualities of the sensible species that are 
unavailable through sense perception? Avicenna assumes the ex-
istence in nonrational animals of an estimative faculty that does 
just that. Explaining how humans apprehend intentions as spe-
cies non sensatae became a difficult and controversial issue, and, 
more generally, the very notion of intention as well as the need 
to postulate the existence of an estimative faculty came to be 
viewed as increasingly problematic in the sixteenth century. The 
only aspect we need to remember here is that in Aquinas cogi-
tatio is the faculty handling the perceptual properties known as 
intentions, which are then stored in the memory. Unlike phan-
tasia, memory allows us to recall sensible forms together with 
their intentions, the affective properties accompanying sensa-
tion — properties such as fear or desire, pleasure or displeasure, 
friendship or enmity.
It is legitimate to presuppose that on a basic level the cog-
itative power in humans is the equivalent of the estimative 
power in nonrational animals. There are however two sub-
stantial differences due to the fact that humans have higher 
rational capacities. The first is the process by which intentions 
are apprehended. “A sheep, by heeding its natural instincts, 
31
manages to transcend its sensory data. Reason, in contrast, 
transcends instinct and does so only by returning to the sen-
sory data themselves.” (PASNAU, 2002, p. 269)25 Cogitation 
operates with the assistance of, and in constant communica-
tion with, the higher-processing faculties of the intellective 
soul. The human ability to grasp intentions is not a purely 
instinctual trigger-response mechanism, but the result of a 
preliminary evaluation of the content of sensory data. The 
second difference has to do with the slippery slope leading 
from intentions to what Aquinas calls sensation per accidens 
in opposition to sensation per se. Sensation per accidens ac-
counts for a well-known phenomenon, namely the ability 
that human beings have to apprehend individual objects as 
belonging to a common category or a class of objects. Within 
the limits of sensation per se I would never see a table as a 
table or a tree as a tree. I would only perceive surfaces, shapes, 
colors. But this almost never happens. What I actually see 
is a table or a tree because human sensation can apprehend 
proper and common sensibles as incidental sensibles, that is, 
as an individual object under the conceptual umbrella of “ta-
ble” or “tree.” In this Scholastic version of “seeing as,” it is 
the cogitative power that is responsible for incidental sensa-
tion26.  Therefore, cogitation has for its proper object both 
intentions and incidental sensibles, the cognition of which 
requires a certain degree of conceptualization provided by the 
intellective soul. 
In the sixteenth century, the doctrine of the internal senses 
– its traits pertaining to the topic of this essay sketched mini-
mally here – came under growing strain. Aside from the hu-
manistic desire to return to the lesson of a more authentically 
Aristotelian philosophy of the mind and a skeptical attitude 
toward the instruments of medieval scholarship, the reasons 
and preoccupations undergirding the work of its critics have 
not yet been fully investigated27.  What is clear is that a reuni-
fied, or at least simplified, conception of the post-sensory and 
pre-intellective activities of the mind had the effect of shifting 
the conversation toward a restoration of the central role that 
phantasia had played in De anima. The original and influ-
ential treatment of the topic in Marsilio Ficino’s Platonism 
also contributed to resetting the philosophical agenda. To the 
Aristotelians phantasia began to look more and more like the 
25. See also Tellkamp 
(2012, p. 611-640).
26.  Robert Pasnau (2002, 
p. 275-278) discusses 
Aquinas’s theory of sensa-
tion per accidens in relation 
to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of the phenom-
enon of “seeing as”.
27.  This is the subject of 
four important studies by 
Francesco Piro: Il retore 
interno: immaginazione 
e passioni all’alba dell’età 
moderna (Naples: La città 
del sole, 1999),p. 123-165; 
“Tra intelligenza animale 
e passioni umane: discus-
sioni sull’immaginazione 
e la ‘virtù estimativa’ nel 
XVI secolo,” in Imago in 
phantasia depicta: studi sulla 
teoria dell’immaginazione, 
ed. Lia Formigari, Giovanni 
Casertano, and Italo 
Cubeddu (Rome: Carocci, 
1999), p. 167-187; “La 
cognizione del desiderio: 
l’immaginazione e la ‘virtù 
estimativa’ tra topografie 
dell’anima medievali e 
proto-moderne,” Quad-
erni dell’Istituto di Filosofia 
di Urbino 1 (October 
1999), p. 55-98; and “E’ 
sufficiente un solo senso 
interno? La psicologia 
dell’immaginazione nella 
prima età moderna e le 
sue difficoltà,” Lo sguardo 
10/3 (2012), p. 183-197. 
See also the overview of 
the status of the discussion 
on the organic soul in the 
sixteenth century in Park 
(1988, p. 464-484).
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sole agent of the operations of the mind in general, the source 
of all thinking. Promotion typically comes with new respon-
sibilities, and phantasia could be easily celebrated as a positive 
force in the reformulation of the intellective potential of man 
or singled out as a source of anxiety for the sensory baggage of 
its operations. Of course, even within the confines of a funda-
mentally orthodox Aristotelian framework, this was no longer 
Aristotle’s phantasia. The long reflection that had led to a 
conceptual topography of the internal senses tainted the work 
of the sixteenth-century proponents of a simplified theory of 
perception. This was inevitable. On the other hand, it is also 
true that the doctrine of the internal senses did not disappear 
altogether. It continued to exert a significant influence among 
Renaissance intellectuals, in part as a byproduct of the Aristo-
telian basis of the university curriculum. This is observable in 
particular in the spheres of knowledge not directly connected 
with the work of professional philosophers. The general un-
derstanding of the workings of the mind among the educated 
elite of the time seems to be still grounded in a basic knowl-
edge of the functions of the internal senses28.  Therefore, be-
fore returning to musical fantasia, I would like to discuss two 
examples of this modulation of meaning in sixteenth-century 
reflections on the nature of love and artistic creation.
What happens when love becomes an obsession? An an-
swer eschewing a conventionally Platonic perspective is pro-
vided by Pompeo della Barba, a physician and man of letters 
who started his career at the university of Pisa as a student of 
the Aristotelian philosopher Simone Porzio and reached the 
position of personal doctor to Pope Pius IV. In his Espositione 
di un sonetto platonico, his literary debut with the Florentine 
Academy where the text had been originally presented in a 
series of lectures, Della Barba reflects on the nature of the 
Platonic concept of the lovers’ death29.The Aristotelian turn 
occurs in Chapter 11, on “the causes of the generation of 
love according to the Peripatetics,” by which he means the 
four Aristotelian causes, carefully reviewed in the first part of 
the chapter. Having clarified the principles of causality, Della 
Barba is now ready to describe the psychological mechanism 
of the origins of love: 
28. It may be worth men-
tioning that a passage in 
chapter 8 of the Soppli-
menti musicali shows that 
Zarlino was conversant 
with the principles of Aris-
totelian faculty psychology. 
Drawing on the Platonic 
doctrine of recollection, 
Zarlino discusses the dif-
ference between the innate 
knowledge of mathematical 
truths and the sense-based 
knowledge that proceeds 
from the phantasms 
elaborated in the phanta-
sia: “Cotale reminiscentia 
non cade nell’animo da i 
sensi esteriori, come fanno 
i fantasmi o specie che 
vengono dalle cose sensi-
bili, che si formano nella 
fantasia, secondo che tiene 
Aristotele.” (ZARLINO, 
1966, p. 27).
29. Pompeo della Barba, 
Espositione d’un son-
etto platonico, fatto sopra 
il primo effetto d’amore che 
è il separare l’anima dal 
corpo de l’amante, dove si 
tratta de la immortalità de 
l’anima secondo Aristotile, 
e secondo Platone. Letta 
nel mese d’aprile nel 1548 
nel consolato del magnifico 
Gianbatista Gello (Flor-
ence: Torrentino, 1549). 
Torrentino reprinted the 
text in 1554 as Spositione 
d’un sonetto platonico; quo-
tations are from this later 
edition. Some of Della 
Barba’s less orthodox ideas 
on the immortality of the 
soul attracted the atten-
tion of the Inquisition. See 
Seidel Menchi (1987, p. 
408-409); Prandi (1990, 
p. 117); and, for a detailed 
discussion of Della Barba’s 
interpretation of the rela-
tionship between soul and 
body, see Maggi (2006, p. 
104-138).
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Love originates because the object enters like an arrow through 
the window of the sense of sight. It first reaches the common 
sense, which judges it a pleasant and enjoyable thing, and recei-
ves it as something that gives great satisfaction. Then [the ob-
ject] enters further in and finds another faculty called imagina-
tion, which, having received that image and species as pleasant, 
embraces it and stores it. After some rest, [the image] climbs far-
ther up and finds another faculty called cogitation, according to 
Averroes, and this [faculty], knowing [the image’s] greatness and 
beauty, seeks to recreate it and re-form its beauty, and to renew 
it more beautifully than it actually is, making it into a most rare 
thing, coupled with all the virtues. From this it happens that the 
beloved object is deemed more beautiful than it is in reality, and 
that lovers deceive themselves because they do not see and love 
the true form, but the form they remade and renewed. Once the 
cogitative faculty has given [the image] its perfection, it sends it 
to the fourth faculty called memory, which stores it. As a result 
reason can no longer block the path of the image of that beauti-
ful object so as to prevent it from reaching the heart, where the 
concupiscible or sensitive appetite is located, which embraces 
[the image] so completely that it cannot desire anything else. 
And this is the love that arises in the heart in the way I just 
described according to the Peripatetics (DELLA BARBA, 1554, 
p. 37-38).
Della Barba appears to understand phantasia as retentive im-
agination, a module for the storing of sensible images collected 
by the common sense. By his account, it also seems that com-
mon sense is responsible for the perception of the intentions of 
the sensible object (in the sense of its affective properties) for 
he believes that the first of the internal senses has the ability to 
“judge” the object as pleasant (which would be the task of the 
cogitative power in Aquinas’s account). Therefore, imagination 
receives the sensible object together with the nonsensible qual-
ity of being pleasant. As we proceed along our mental journey, 
cogitation takes up some of the traits of composite imagina-
tion. It composes and recomposes forms or images. However, 
on a closer look, what I think Della Barba is suggesting is that 
cogitation “knows” the beauty of the sensible object in a way 
distinct from the judging activity of the common sense. In 
other words, it is through the cogitative power that we become 
aware of the beauty of what is now our object of desire, whereas 
common sense simply extracts the nonsensible intentions from 
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sensible objects. And inflamed by this awareness, or illusory 
knowledge of the object’s beauty, cogitation becomes fixated 
on the object itself. Incidentally, we may notice that, in typi-
cally early-modern fashion, the experience of love (or perhaps 
the wrong kind of love) is portrayed as a derailment of the ab-
stractive process of intellection. Under optimal conditions, the 
sensible object, stored in the memory as an intelligible species, 
would be known in its proper, rational, and true form through 
the illumination of the agent intellect. Only then would we be 
able to apprehend the value of the object sub ratione boni. But 
because of the intensity of the pleasure accompanying sensa-
tion, the cogitative power may overestimate the actual value of 
the sensible image and begin to reproduce nonveridical mental 
representations of it. At this point, the internal senses, trapped 
in a sort of mental loop, trigger the response of the appetitive 
faculties, which effect motion through an obsessive pursuit of 
an unrealistically high good.
We can sympathize with Della Barba if the functions as-
signed to each internal sense appear in constant fluctuation 
as we move from one author to another. However, there is a 
recognizable core theory at work, and one of its recurring ele-
ments is the combinatorial mechanism by virtue of which sen-
sible species are turned into phantasmata. As we shall see mo-
mentarily, this ability to extract, divide, and recompose forms 
can be construed as reasoning. There is an obvious danger in 
attributing too much weight to what phantasia and cogitation 
do, and the distinction between this pre-intellective manipu-
lation of individual forms and true intellection of universal 
essences can become suspiciously blurred. Indeed, the same 
elemental analytical capacity of the compositive imagination 
can drag the soul back down to the world of sensible particu-
lars, with all the errors of judgment and false beliefs that can 
easily ensue thereby.
One of the most eloquent documents regarding the reso-
nance of this anatomy of the mind in sixteenth-century cultural 
debate is the lecture on Michelangelo’s famous sonnet “Non ha 
l’ottimo artista alcun concetto” delivered by Benedetto Varchi 
in 1547 before the members of the Florentine Academy30.  The 
opening quatrain offers a miniature theory of the creative pro-
cess from a sculptor’s point of view:
30. Benedetto Varchi, Due 
lezzioni di M. Benedetto 
Varchi, nella prima delle 
quali si dichiara un sonetto 
di M. Michelagnolo Buonar-
roti (Florence: Torrentino, 
1550); modern edition in 
Opere di Benedetto Varchi 
ora per la prima volta 
raccolte, con un discorso 
di A. Racheli intorno alla 
filologia del secolo XVI e alla 
vita e agli scritti dell’autore, 
2 vols. (Trieste: Sezione 
letterario-artistica del 
Lloyd austriaco, 1858), p. 
613-627. The philosophi-
cal and cultural context 
of Varchi’s lectures at the 
Florentine Academy is 
reconstructed in Andreoni 
(2012). Although centered 
on the fourteenth century, 
Martin Kemp’s essay cited 
above provides an excellent 
discussion of the notion of 
phantasia in the theory of 
the art. The vast bibliogra-
phy on Michelangelo’s son-
net is listed (up to 1997) 
in Agoston (1997, p. 552). 
On Varchi’s writings on the 
visual arts see also Collar-
eta, (2007, p. 173-184).
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Non ha l’ottimo artista alcun concetto,
Ch’un marmo solo in sé non circoscriva
Col suo soverchio, e solo a quello arriva
La mano che ubbidisce all’intelletto. 
Not even the best of artists has any conception
that a single marble block does not contain
within its excess, and that is only attained
by the hand that obeys the intellect.
Varchi carries Michelangelo’s account a considerable dis-
tance further, and winds up retracing every step of the inner 
journey from sense perception to intellective cognition and 
back to the world of the sensible objects recreated by the art-
ist. We can only dwell on two moments of this journey, which 
coincide with Varchi’s explanation of the meaning of “intellect” 
and “concept.”
Intelletto: This word means many things … and it is properly in 
us that most noble part of the soul through which we unders-
tand, and it is often called mind […] But here the word is taken 
otherwise, that is for that potency or virtue called imagination 
or phantasia, ... which, although it composes, divides, and fi-
nally discourses like the rational soul, nonetheless discourses not 
about universal things, as reason does, but about particulars.31 
Varchi’s language recalls Aquinas’, except for the fact that 
the faculty that for Aquinas functions as a ratio particularis is 
the cogitative power. Indeed, in relation to this capacity to ap-
prehend particulars, Varchi does not regard phantasia as dis-
tinct from cogitation32.  Phantasia – which in this sense resem-
bles Aristotle’s broader conception of the pre-intellective life 
of the sensitive soul – is for Varchi a lower form of discursive 
reasoning by virtue of its ability to handle particulars the same 
way that intellect handles universals. Michelangelo was there-
fore justified – Varchi continues – in using the term intelletto 
to denote imagination. As a result of its elaborative activity, 
phantasia, which in its operations precedes intellection by con-
tributing to the production of the phantasmata to be presented 
to the intellect, provides the artist with the idea of the object 
to be realized in matter. But what is this idea or concept really?
31. “Questo nome intellet-
to significa più cose […] ed 
è propiamente in noi quella 
parte più nobile dell’anima 
per la quale noi intendia-
mo, e si chiama molte volte 
mente […] Ma in questo 
luogo si piglia altramente, 
cioè per quella potenza o 
virtù che si chiama immag-
inazione, o vero fantasia, 
[…] E se bene compone, 
divide e finalmente discorre 
come l’anima razionale, 
discorre però non le cose 
universali, come quella, ma 
solamente le particolari.”  
Varchi, Opere, vol. 2, p. 
619. See also Summers 
(1987, p. 227-230), from 
which I draw the English 
translation.
32. Marco Sgarbi has clari-
fied the terms of Varchi’s 
identification of phantasia 
with cogitation in a recent 
study based on a set of 
manuscript treatises by 
Varchi himself, now in the 
National Library in Flor-
ence, devoted to the soul 
and its functions. The issue 
is further complicated by 
Varchi’s additional identi-
fication of the imagination 
with the possible or passive 
intellect, the former being 
in potency what the latter 
is in actuality. “Varchi not 
only identifies the passive 
intellect with the imagina-
tion, but also the imagina-
tion with the cogitative 
faculty, or discourse. The 
cogitative faculty differs 
from the imagination only 
in that the latter abstracts 
solely from the presence of 
sensibles, while the former 
also from the accidents of 
sensibles, such as time and 
place, forming arguments 
and thoughts.” (SGARBI, 
2015, p. 12). The first of 
the philosophical treatises 
in the National Library on 
the divisions of the soul 
(covering the vegetative 
soul, the sensitive soul, 
and the intellective soul) is 
edited in Andreoni (2012, 
p.  338-342).
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Concetto: The meaning of this word, which is as beautiful as it 
is vast, is the same in Tuscan as “idea” in Greek or “notio” in 
Latin. And in order to better understand its meaning, one must 
know that nothing can be said or done unless it is first conceived 
or thought of in the mind, that is, imagined in the phantasia 
[…] And therefore, the first principle or, one might say, the effi-
cient cause of everything that is said or done is the species, form, 
image, likeness, idea, example, exemplar, similitude, intention, 
concept, or model, or, as otherwise one could or should say, si-
mulacrum, or phantasm, which is in the virtù fantastica, or, as 
we may want to say, in the imaginative power of he who wants 
to “make or say. (VARCHI, 1858, v. 2, p. 616)
The most striking aspect of this passage is the reproduction 
of the linguistic struggle necessary to capture the meaning of 
the sensory representations that constitute the object of the 
internal senses. What are they exactly? Forms, images, resem-
blances, models, species? In the end, the technically correct an-
swer is phantasmata. The difficulty is comprehensible, because a 
phantasm is not, to use an expression borrowed from scholastic 
philosophy, quod intelligitur but quo intelligitur; it is not what 
is understood, but that by which we understand. It is as if in 
Varchi’s words we can still hear the echo of the conversations 
of the members of the Florentine Academy wrestling with the 
most esoteric aspects of Aristotelian psychology. But the most 
important point Varchi makes in the context of this essay is the 
elevation of the content of phantasia to the first principle of 
everything that human beings say and make. The perfect art-
ist has the ability to translate the product of the post-sensory 
activity of the imagination into a material object, thus closing 
a circle from sense to phantasia back to sense. Citing the most 
learned commentator of Aristotle (by which he means Aver-
roes), Varchi concludes: “Ars nihil aliud est, quam forma rei 
artificialis, existens in anima artificis, quae est principium fac-
tivum formae artificialis in materia.” But he glosses “existens 
in anima artificis” by restricting the meaning of “anima” to a 
single faculty, namely the artist’s phantasia (cioè nella fantasia 
dell’artista). (VARCHI, 1858, v. 2, p. 617)33 
33. It is worth noticing 
that by identifying imagi-
nation with cogitation as 
ratio particularis within 
which the idea of the work 
is formed, Varchi strength-
ens the role of phantasia 
in the creative process. 
However, he also seems to 
confine sculpture – and 
presumably the figurative 
arts in general – to the 
domain of the knowledge 
of sensible particulars, 
closing the door to that of 
the knowledge of universal 
essences.
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 THE SOUND OF PHANTASIA IN MOTION
We can take our cue from Varchi to prod at the idea of 
musical fantasia one more time. If an artist turns the forma rei 
artificialis into a physical object, what is the outward manifesta-
tion of a musician’s imagination? In an attempt to comprehend 
what mode of thought allowed an author to recognize phan-
tasia in the music that he or she knew as fantasia, or the way 
somebody like Varchi might have listened to a lute or keyboard 
fantasia as the specifically musical product of the mind’s imagi-
native power, I would suggest the following:
1. The principle of elaboration so often on display in the 
fantasia seems to resonate with a typically medieval and ear-
ly-modern notion of compositive imagination. Phantasia as-
sembles, divides, and recomposes sensible forms, often in an 
“imaginary” fashion, but not an unruly one. Imagination has 
a logic of its own, even in its nonveridical manifestations, a 
logic delimited by sensible particulars whose nature it cannot 
transcend. This way of thinking about imagination draws a 
subtle line linking sonare di fantasia to contrappunto alla mente. 
Viewed from this perspective, “playing by phantasia” becomes 
synonymous with “making counterpoint in the mind.” In 
other words, if focused on sound, “fantasizing” constitutes a 
pre-intellective form of contrapuntal “thinking.”34 By the same 
token, a sixteenth-century listener could argue that contrapun-
tal elaboration is primarily a property of phantasia as a mental 
process, and only secondarily a stylistic feature of fantasia as a 
musical process. Therefore, music thus conceived might as well 
be called fantasia. 
2. The question remains of how to distinguish comporre di 
fantasia from writing counterpoint tout court. Even Zarlino 
considered the two expressions somewhat redundant. One 
possible answer is that the difference lies in the temporal di-
mension of fantasia, a dimension implicit in the semantic 
association between fantasia and improvisation. We can try 
again to put ourselves in the mind of a sixteenth-century lis-
tener. When I hear Francesco da Milano improvising a fanta-
sia, what I am actually hearing is the activity of his phantasia 
in real time.35 Conversely, a contrapuntal composition is a 
structure built step by step through reasoning, under the aegis 
34. It should be stressed 
that in this context “pre-
intellective” does mean 
that the operations of the 
imagination are irratio-
nal, but rather that they 
are limited to particulars 
rather than universals. It is 
in this sense that Varchi, 
for example, understands 
the rational role of the 
imagination in the creative 
process. 
35. Viewed in these terms, 
one may wonder if “com-
posing by fantasy” went 
against the grain of the 
mimetic conception of 
human arts prevailing in 
the Renaissance, whether 
in the general sense of 
imitation of nature, or 
in the more specific one 
of imitation of the affec-
tive content of words. As 
self-generating textless 
counterpoint, fantasia 
would represent a non-
mimetic type of music 
conceived and developed 
in the musician’s mind 
while reflecting upon the 
properties themselves of 
musical sounds. 
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of the intellect, which alone deals with universals and whose 
proper object is not any individual composition but musica 
scientia. The results are recognizably different as two different 
kinds of music, one reflecting standard formulas of contrap-
punto alla mente, diversions, and licenses evoking the law of 
instantaneous judgment, and the other sustaining the struc-
tural logic, for example, of a text-bound motet. 
3. Fantasia, understood as a dynamic unfolding of the 
operations of phantasia, substantially differs from a static 
artifact such as a statue or a painting. The process Varchi 
sought to explicate applies to poiesis in general, the reali-
zation of thought into matter in the act of “making.” A 
composition could be described as the product of the same 
process, involving phantasia as its efficient cause, to use 
Varchi’s words. However, fantasia is something different in 
that it claims, in this interpretation, to make the move-
ments of phantasia audible in real time, as we listen, down-
stream, to the flow of phantasia’s treasury of musical ideas 
in motion. In this sense, fantasia is not a composition, or 
res facta, but a snapshot of a mental activity.
4. Despite this temporal and extemporaneous dimension, 
fantasias could be and indeed were written out in musical 
notation, printed, and re-performed. As I mentioned at the 
outset, the relationship between written text and improvisa-
tory practice is an intricate one. One of the insights crystal-
lized within the exam for the post of organist at San Marco, 
requesting that the improvised fantasia retain the properties 
of a regular four-voice counterpoint, is that sixteenth-century 
musical taste appreciated improvised music that mimicked 
the logic of contrapuntal writing, almost as if the examiners 
were indeed thinking of phantasia as a ratio particularis. The 
opposite is also true, as in the case of a composed work mim-
icking the experience of an improvised performance. This 
distinction in fact becomes practically untenable in a society 
where there is no meaningful distinction between composer 
and performer. However, none of this changes the fact that 
sixteenth-century listeners and musicians invested this type 
of music with a special meaning, one fixed in its analogical 
designation as fantasia/phantasia.
5. The temporal and extemporaneous dimension of fanta-
sia brings to the fore the relationship between retentive imagi-
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nation and compositive imagination in a manner that is not 
essential to the theory of artistic creation as applied to static 
objects. The idea that phantasia acts as a type of memory is 
implicit in the empirical experience of improvisation. The 
pedagogical literature on the topic provided a normative ver-
sion of the same intuition by making it abundantly clear that 
memory is a prerequisite of the art of improvisation, the other 
side of the same coin.36 We may now add that the doctrine 
of the internal senses provided the conceptual tools to dis-
tinguish memory as a storehouse of sensory building blocks 
that phantasia can use, even when there is no accompany-
ing sensation, from memory as the property of “being in the 
past.” The latter is memory in the proper sense of the term, 
the fourth of the internal senses in Aquinas’s account. “Being 
in the past” is stored there as a nonsensible intentio extracted 
from the sensible species by the cogitative power.37 Therefore, 
what is in the faculty of memory can be apprehended sub ra-
tione temporis. On the other hand, phantasia retains sensible 
forms (in this case sounds, contrapuntal formulas, etc.) with-
out any additional nonsensible connotation. Its function is to 
make them readily available independently of the nonsensible 
“memories” associated with their apprehension. The distinc-
tion between retentive imagination and memory may seem 
to be lost in the words of the humanist Giovan Battista Gelli 
(1498-1563), who refers to one of the internal senses as “the 
power that philosophers call fantasy or memory.” (GELLI, 
1887, p. 530)38 But despite these fluctuations in the cultural 
declensions of the vocabulary of faculty psychology (to be fair, 
Gelli shortly thereafter demonstrates an understanding of the 
distinction), it was this tradition of thought that fostered such 
a natural and rich set of musical correspondences between 
phantasia, memory, and improvisation.
I think it is in these terms that we can understand the 
ambiguous nature of the musical fantasia in the sixteenth 
century — ambiguous in its capacity to conjugate rule and 
license, contrapuntal elaboration and structural freedom, 
invention and discipline, ratio and improvisation. From our 
vantage point in history, fantasia also offers a rare opportunity 
to observe a cultural and musical practice aimed at translating 
the workings of the mind into a sensible object, which the 
36. The link between 
fantasia and memory is 
discussed in Butler (1974) 
and further developed in 
Lorenzetti (2009, p. 132-
142).
37. See Pasnau (2002, p. 
280-281).
38. See also Lorenzetti 
(2009, p. 134).
40
perceiving subject can then (re)experience as a representation 
of his own inner life, in the way he himself imagines it.
By way of conclusion, I would like to mention one last 
terminological variation on fantasia. Between 1552 and 1584, 
the Flemish publishing house Phalèse issued four collections 
of lute music on whose title pages the fantasias are advertised, 
in Greek letters, as automata (“ἀυτόματα, quae fantasiae 
dicuntur”).39  It would seem that human agency had been 
entirely removed; fantasia stands alone as a self-operating 
machine. But there are other ways to interpret this unusual 
synonymic pairing. However peculiar it may appear at first, 
Phalèse’s choice of words does evoke a by-now familiar notion 
of phantasia. As a matter of fact, it evokes a concatenation of 
meanings not dissimilar from those of the phantasia/fantasia 
continuum that I have explored in this essay. We must take 
one last trip along this continuum without one end having to 
invalidate the other.
It is possible that the meaning of “automaton” that 
Phalèse had in mind was closer to Aristotle’s use of the term 
in the second book of Physics, usually translated into English 
as “spontaneity.” In this case, fantasia would primarily con-
note a self-generating form, a contrapuntal procedure that 
triggers its own occurrence. Zarlino’s description of the pro-
cess of “composing by fantasy” comes to mind again. The 
contrapuntal device articulated within the musician’s mind 
contains the principle of its own development. Taken to-
gether, Phalèse and Zarlino invite us to think of fantasia as 
the spontaneous combustion of a contrapuntal compound. 
This interpretation places emphasis on the object and reads 
“automaton” as an attribute of the music. We can also place 
emphasis on phantasia and read “automaton” as an attribute 
of the thinking subject. Fantasia then can be understood not 
so much a self-articulating mechanism but, as I mentioned 
above, the outward manifestation of a mental activity — 
something that occurs as a cognitive antecedent of thought 
rather than thought itself. If that is the case, in what sense 
does phantasia exhibit the properties of an automaton?
Gregory Butler finds musical analogies in the following 
definition of automaton: “a piece of mechanism with con-
cealed motive power endued with spontaneous motion, the 
39. See nos. 13, 98, 123, 
and 156 in Catalogue 
des éditions de musique 
publiées à Louvain par 
Pierre Phalèse et ses fils 
1545-1578, ed. Henri 
Vanhulst (Bruxelles: Palais 
des académies, 1990). In 
the Theatrum musicum 
(1571), “praeludium” is 
added as another synonym 
of fanatasia (“ἀυτόματα, 
quae fantasiae vel praeludia 
nuncupantur”). 
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result of an unthinking routine or action performed uncon-
sciously or subconsciously.” (BUTLER, 1974, p. 610). We 
can further interrogate the second part of this definition by 
relocating the “unthinking routine” within the cognitive pro-
tocol of the internal senses. Among the many issues surround-
ing phantasia’s mediating role between sense and intellection 
is also the extent to which its operations may be random and 
subconscious. Phantasia may indeed be said to operate on a 
subconscious level, in the simple Aristotelian sense that phan-
tasia is a motion of the soul triggered by sensation. Moreover, 
phantasia remains active as a processing unit of sensible spe-
cies and newly formed images even if there is no occurring 
sensation. In short, phantasia cannot be turned off, not even 
when we sleep; this is why we dream. There is also a sense in 
which phantasia can be said to operate in random fashion. As 
a precursor to thought, its task is to explore all of the possible 
permutations of sensible data collected by the common sense, 
even though phantasia has no knowledge of the meaning that 
its generated images may acquire once they are presented to 
the intellect. It does not require reason’s consent to operate. 
This ignorance, so to speak, is at the same time its strength 
and its weakness. It is its strength because the imagination 
is free to entertain possibilities and to imagine the world as 
different from how it is. But it is also its weakness because its 
image-producing engine generates a certain amount of cogni-
tive noise. The combinatorial mechanism under which phan-
tasia operates may appear elusive, bizarre, beyond the grasp 
of self-conscious knowledge. Its activity is a necessary step in 
the abstractive process leading to intellection, but the mental 
images it produces do not have meaning in themselves, even 
though, under certain circumstances, they may create the illu-
sion that they do. The world that the imagination can conjure 
up, if unchecked by the intellect and contemplated as an end 
in itself, can lead to self-deception. The upshot is that such a 
power can be consciously harnessed and constructively direct-
ed towards artistic creation, even if this may mean stretching 
the boundaries of rational thought.
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